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Abstract

By examining voting behavior in a referendum on the construction of a concert hall in Germany, I show that political ideology influences cultural policy. The results suggest that resistance to the concert hall was particularly strong in electoral districts in which majorities of citizens vote for the social democrats. By contrast, constituents of rightwing parties voted more in favor of the project. This voting pattern indicates that cultural policy is ideology-induced. The direct-democratic vote against the concert hall is not in line with the voting behavior of the representatives in the city council. My findings thus show that the voting behavior of political representatives may be decoupled from the preferences of their constituents even in closely knit jurisdictions in which the principal-agent relationship between voters and representatives is usually thought to favor the principals. Moreover, this decoupling has been documented for a policy issue that does not require substantial information or specialized knowledge to be evaluated but rather voters' decisions are based on ideological convictions.

Keywords: cultural policy, ideology, partisan politics, referendum, direct democracy

JEL Classification: Z10, D72, D78, H72

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1. Introduction

Political ideology is likely to influence cultural policy. The constituencies of conservative parties are expected to support traditional cultural values such as theatres, concerts, operas and art exhibitions more so than voters of the left such as blue-collar workers (e.g. Schulze and Ursprung 2000).² Scholars have investigated how government ideology has influenced expenditures on cultural affairs. The evidence is mixed. In Germany, empirical studies show that rightwing parties place more emphasis on culture. For example, Schulze and Rose (1998) examine the determinants of public orchestra funding in Germany and their results suggest that conservative and liberal politicians tend to support classical orchestras more than social democratic and Green politicians do.³ Rightwing governments have spent more on cultural affairs in the German states (Potrafke 2011).⁴ Government ideology did not, however, influence cultural expenditures in Austria (Getzner 2002) and Flemish municipalities (Werck et al. 2008).⁵

Yet I am not aware of any empirical study that examines the influence of political ideology on cultural policy in a referendum. Against the background that political preferences in referenda may be better transmitted than by political representatives (e.g., Feld and Savioz 1997, Feld and Matsusaka 2003, Feld et al. 2008, 2010, 2011), investigating the influence of political ideology on cultural policy in a referendum is a worthwhile endeavor.

In this paper, I therefore examine for the first time whether political ideology has influenced voting behavior in a referendum on cultural policy. I employ data on the vote on the construction of the concert hall in Konstanz (Germany) from March 21, 2010. The results

² See Kay (1983) on ideology and state control of the arts in socialist societies.

³ On the influence of interest groups on performing public arts institutions in Germany see Krebs and Pommerehne (1995).

⁴ In a similar vein, rightwing governments spent more on universities than leftwing governments in the German states (Oberndorfer and Steiner 2007, Potrafke 2011). Schulze's (2008) results suggest that conservative politicians spent more on research in relative terms. The reason may well be that the clientele of leftist parties profit relatively little from public expenditures on higher education. In Switzerland, social democratic ideology has had a negative influence on privatizing education (Merzyn and Ursprung 2005).

⁵ Brooks (2001) employs data from the US General Social Survey and finds that a self-described "conservative" ideology positively influenced opposition to government arts funding whereas a self-described "liberal" ideology negatively influenced opposition to government arts funding.

suggest that resistance to the concert hall was particularly strong in electoral districts in which majorities of citizens vote for the social democrats. By contrast, constituents of rightwing parties voted more in favor of the project. This voting pattern indicates that cultural policy is ideology-induced. The direct-democratic vote against the concert hall is not in line with the voting behavior of the representatives in the city council. My findings thus show that the voting behavior of political representatives may be decoupled from the preferences of their constituents even in closely knit jurisdictions in which the principal-agent relationship between voters and representatives is usually thought to favor the principals. Moreover, this decoupling has been documented for a policy issue that does not require substantial information or specialized knowledge to be evaluated but rather voters' decisions are based on ideological convictions.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical strategy; it describes the data and variables and specifies the empirical model. Section 3 discusses the regression results. Section 4 concludes.

2. Empirical strategy

2.1 Data and variables

The referendum

I use data on the voting outcome of the referendum on the construction of the concert hall in Konstanz (Germany) on March 21, 2010. The dataset contains 65 observations for all electoral districts (the appendix provides a list of the 65 electoral districts and boroughs). Voters have been asked whether they agree on building a concert hall at the area „Klein-

Venedig“ which is located directly at the shore of Lake Konstanz. The construction volume has been approximated to be about 48 million euros.⁶

A significant majority voted against the construction of the concert hall: 20.800 voters (65.7%) voted against and 10.875 voters (34.2%) voted for the construction of the concert hall.⁷ The voting turnout was 52.2%, so that the result of the referendum is effectual (quorum 25%). The concert hall will not be built.

The clear-cut result is surprising for two reasons: (1) the mayor initiated the project and (2) voters in Konstanz traditionally esteem cultural activities. An important reason for the patent vote against the construction of the concert hall appears to be the location. Many voters would likely have voted in favor of a concert hall in Konstanz but disagreed with the location directly at the shore of the Lake Konstanz.

The political party landscape

Two major political parties have characterized the political spectrum in Germany: the leftist Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The much smaller Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Green party (GR) have played an important role as coalition partners at the federal and state level. The FDP is a liberal/market-oriented party and the Greens have traditionally followed rather leftwing policies. In Konstanz, however, the Green party receives disproportionately high support. For example, Konstanz has been the first city in Germany whose mayor belongs to the Green party. At the local level, the so called “Free voters” also campaign. The Free Voters have political platforms in the middle of the political spectrum.

⁶ For a discussion on theoretical arguments for public support to cultural activities see, for example, Frey and Pommerehne (1989) and Frey (2000). On private demand for public subsidies to the arts see, e.g., Pommerehne and Schneider (1983).

⁷ This includes 6.714 postal voters. Voting behavior between postal and ballot box voters was very similar: 62.7% of the postal voters and 66.5% of the ballot box voters voted against the proposal.

The electorate for referenda corresponds with the electorate for local elections. In contrast to German federal and state elections, permanent residents are also allowed to participate in referenda and local elections. I therefore use the voting turnout of the last local elections held on June 7, 2009 in order to describe the political preferences in the 65 electoral districts. The voting outcome of the local elections held on June 7, 2009 was as follows (excluding postal votes): SPD 18.37%, CDU 21.55%, Green 23.54%, FDP 10.32%, Free Voters 13.83%, Leftist Party (Linke Liste Konstanz) 4.96%, others 7.43%. I do not include the postal vote electoral districts because they are different for every single election or referendum.

Correlation between the voting outcome of the referendum and political ideology

In order to illustrate the association between the voting outcome of the referendum on the construction of the concert hall (No's share) and political ideology, I present correlations between the share of votes against the construction of the concert hall and the voting outcome of the last local elections for all 65 electoral districts.

One can see with the naked eye that resistance to the construction of the concert hall was pronounced in electoral districts in which citizens vote for the SPD (Figure 1) and the leftist "Linke Liste" (Figure 2). By contrast, resistance was much less pronounced in electoral districts in which citizens vote for the CDU (Figure 3) and in particular for the FDP (Figure 4). Fewest resistances occurred in districts in which the "Free Voters" receive strong support (Figure 5). Advocates of the Greens were divided on the concert hall referendum. The correlation between the share of the Green Party and No's on the referendum is 0.07 (Figure 6). On the one hand, the Greens belong to the camp of the political left that strongly opposed the construction of the concert hall, on the other hand the mayor who initiated building the concert hall belongs to the Green party.

2.2 The econometric model

The econometric model has the following form:

$$\text{Referendum Vote Share (No)}_i = \sum_k \alpha_k \text{'Ideology'}_{ik} + \sum_l \beta_l X_{il} + \gamma \text{Neighbor}_i + \delta \text{Non-Neighbor}_i + u_i$$

$$\text{with } i = 1, \dots, 65; k = 1, \dots, 6; l = 1, 2 \quad (2)$$

where the dependent variable Referendum Vote Share (No)_i denotes the share of votes against the construction of the concert hall in electoral district i. $\sum_k \alpha_k \text{'Ideology'}_{ikt}$ describes the voting share for the single political parties during the last local election in electoral district i. To avoid multicollinearity between the political party variables, one of the political party variables must function as the reference category (here SPD). The estimated effects of the other the political party variables must then be interpreted as deviations from the reference category. $\sum_l \beta_l X_{il}$ contains two exogenous control variables. I include the overall voting turnout (in % of the eligible voters) and the number of eligible voters in every electoral district. The overall voting turnout controls for public interest in the referendum. The number of eligible voters in every electoral district controls for the size of the electoral district. The electoral districts are quite small (935 eligible voters on average). For this reason, no other economic control variables such as income per capita or education levels are available. "Neighbor_i" is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for the electoral districts that are geographically close to the location where the concert hall should have been built and zero otherwise.⁸ Voters who live close to the suggested location may vote against the proposal because congestion might increase traffic associated with the concert hall. Parking is very restrictive in Konstanz' city center. "Non-Neighbor_i" is a dummy variable that takes on the

⁸I assign the electoral districts in the boroughs "Altstadt" and "Paradies" as neighbors.

value one for the electoral districts that are geographically far from the location where the concert hall should have been built and zero otherwise.⁹ Lastly, u_i describes an error term.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables included. I estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors. It is important to note that the dependent variable neither takes on the value zero nor one in the entire sample. I therefore do not need to estimate a censored regression model (e.g., Tobit). The standard assumptions of OLS are fulfilled.

3. Regression Results

Table 2 illustrates the regression results. Column (1) shows the results when no control variables are included. In columns (2) to (4) I have included the control variables subsequently. The control variables do not turn out to be statistically significant, including the control variables does not, however, change the inferences regarding the political variables at all. By contrast, the political party variables have a significant influence on the referendum's voting outcome. The Linke Liste and CDU variables do not turn out to be statistically significant. The FDP variables are statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (4). The numerical meaning of the coefficients is that a corresponding increase of the voting share for the FDP by one point would decrease the No's share in the referendum by about 1.3 points. The Free Voters variables are also statistically significant at the 1% level, the Green variables at the 5% level in column (1) and at the 10% level in columns (2) to (4), the variable Other at the 10% level. The numerical meaning of the coefficients is that a corresponding increase of the voting share for the Free Voters and Greens by one point would decrease the No's share in the referendum by about 1.07 and 0.47 points. The numerical meaning of the coefficients of the variable Other is that a corresponding increase of the voting share for the

⁹ I assign the electoral districts in the boroughs "Egg", "Litzelstetten", "Dingelsdorf", "Dettingen", "Wallhausen" as non-neighbors.

other parties by one point would increase the No's share in the referendum by about 0.63 points. Consequently, the results show that resistance to the construction of the concert hall was less severe in electoral districts where citizens vote for the FDP, Free Voters, and Greens compared to electoral districts where citizens vote for the SPD.

Robustness Checks

I checked the robustness of the results in several ways. Results could be sensitive to the chosen reference category of the political variables because the voting shares of the political parties differ. Table 3 shows the regression results in which I have changed the reference category of the political variables from "SPD" to "other". The results in Table 3 suggest that the results are not sensitive to the reference category at all. The political party variables in columns (1) to (4) are all statistically significant. The size of the coefficients of the political party variables indicates that voting on the concert hall has been ideology-induced. For example, the coefficient of the SPD variable is about -0.6 and indicates that compared to the other parties the share of No's in the referendum decreased by about 0.6 points when the voting share of the SPD increased by 1 point. The coefficient of the FDP variable is, however, about -1.9 and indicates that compared to the other parties the share of No's in the referendum decreased by about 1.9 points when the voting share of the FDP increased by 1 point. It is important to note that the coefficients of the Linke Liste variables are somewhat bigger than the coefficients of the CDU variables in absolute terms. The reason is that the vote shares of the CDU are more than four times as large as the vote shares of the Linke Liste on average. Given the distribution of the Linke Liste and CDU variables the results express higher resistance to the construction of the concert hall in districts in which citizens vote for the Linke Liste. I have also used all the other party share variables as reference category and inferences do not change.

Further control variables are likely to influence preferences on cultural policy. Ideally we would like to control for variables such as income per capita or education. For example, higher educated citizens are more likely to listen to classic music (e.g., Prieto-Rodríguez and Fernández-Blanco 2000) and attend classic music concerts (e.g., Favaro and Frateschi 2007). Religion may also influence preferences on cultural policy (e.g. Katz-Gerro et al. 2009). The reason for the lack of control variables is the small size of the electoral districts. There are no data on income and education available yet.¹⁰ In order to approximate differences in income I included a high income borough dummy variable which takes on the value one for boroughs with many one-family houses and mansions and zero otherwise.¹¹ The high income borough dummy variable does not turn out to be statistically significant, but including it does not change the inferences regarding the political variables at all.

Data on religion are available on borough level for the year 2009. Four categories can be distinguished: Protestants, Catholics, Other Religion and No Religion. I include these religion variables as a share of total population in the respective borough. No Religion is the reference category. Table 4 shows the regression results when the religion variables are included. Compared to districts where citizens are less religious, resistance to the construction of the concert hall was strong in electoral districts where citizens are Catholic. The Catholic religion variable has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level in column (1) and at the 5% level in column (2). By contrast, compared to districts where citizens were less religious, Protestants voted more in favor of the project. The Protestant religion variable has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level in column (1) and at the 5% level in column (3). The Other Religion variable does not turn out to be statistically significant. Several variables do not turn out to be statistically significant in column (4)

¹⁰ The Statistical Office Konstanz currently collaborates with the German Federal Statistical Office in order to compile estimates on the income distribution in Konstanz (on borough level). These data may be available in 2011.

¹¹ I am indebted to Eberhard Baier from Statistical Office Konstanz for choosing the boroughs "Petershausen-Ost", "Allmannsdorf", "Staad", "Egg", "Litzelstetten", "Dingelsdorf" and "Wallhausen" as high income boroughs.

because of the decreasing number of freedoms. The findings on the religion variables might appear counterintuitive at a first glance. It turns out, however, that Protestants mostly live in the high income boroughs. The Protestant variable is strongly positively correlated with the high income borough variable (correlation coefficient 0.74). Highly qualified individuals who have moved to Konstanz in order work in the Lake Konstanz or Zurich area appear to be Protestants, whereas the local petty bourgeoisie is predominantly Catholic. In any event, including the religion variables does not change the inferences regarding the political variables.

Scholars have tested for ideology-induced effects on German economic policy-making also employing left-right dummy variables (e.g. Seitz 2000, Schneider 2010). The reason is that all federal chancellors and state prime ministers have been members of one of these two major blocks, SPD and CDU (CSU in Bavaria). German parties can be grouped in a leftwing camp (SPD, Green, LINKE) and a rightwing camp (CDU/CSU and FDP). I have included a variable “Leftwing” that is the sum of voting shares for the SPD, Greens and leftist “Linke Liste” and a variable “Righthwing” that is the sum of voting shares for the CDU and FDP. The results indicate that differences between the two camps were rather small. The reason is the non-partisan behavior and the high vote share of the Greens.

The reported effects could be driven or mitigated by idiosyncratic circumstances in the individual electoral districts. For this reason, I tested whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of particular electoral districts. Inferences do not change when excluding an individual electoral district.

A caveat applying to all econometric models concerns potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. In my analysis, however, endogeneity problems cannot occur because I regress the voting outcome from March 21, 2010 on the voting outcome from June 7, 2009.

One may well employ the voting outcome from the previous local elections (held on June 13, 2004) instead of the voting outcome from local elections from June 7, 2009 for

robustness checks. The electoral districts have been, however, re-organized from 2004 to 2009 so that I cannot employ previous voting outcomes.

4. Conclusion

Ideology influences cultural policy. Voters were not inclined to vote for the construction of the concert hall in Konstanz (Germany) on March 21, 2010. Resistance to the concert hall was particularly strong in electoral districts where majorities of citizens vote for the social democrats. By contrast, constituents of rightwing parties voted more in favor of the project. This voting pattern is in line with the preferences of the parties' constituencies: advocates of conservative and liberal parties support traditional cultural values such as theatres, concerts, operas and art exhibitions more than advocates of the social democrats and socialists who do not want to have spent money on culture but favor income redistribution.

The innovation of my paper is to investigate the influence of political ideology on cultural policy in a referendum for the first time. The direct-democratic vote against the construction of the concert hall is not in line with the voting behavior of the representatives in the city council. The city council in Konstanz has 40 seats: 10 Green, 9 CDU, 7 SPD, 6 Free Voters, 4 FDP, 2 Linke Liste and 1 seat each of other parties. In April 2009, a majority consisting of the CDU, FDP, Free Voters and 5 of the Green council members voted for the construction of the concert hall (24 yes, 15 no, 1 council member did not attend the meeting). The SPD voted as a block against the proposal. This voting behavior is in line with the platforms of the political parties on the construction of the concert hall (Stadt Konstanz 2010a, 2010b). In January 2010, the city council decided to initiate a referendum on the construction of the concert hall for two reasons. First, the decision has been regarded to be so important and the financial volume to be so huge that the voters should have a say in it. Second, a referendum could have been initiated by the citizens anyhow by collecting more than 5.000 signatures. The city council wanted to prevent the citizens from calling a referendum and initiated it itself. The

referendum did not result in a majority for the proposal because also many conservative and liberal voters did not agree with the location of the concert hall. My findings thus show that the voting behavior of political representatives may be decoupled from the preferences of their constituents even in closely knit jurisdictions in which the principal-agent relationship between voters and representatives is usually thought to favor the principals. Moreover, this decoupling has been documented for a policy issue that does not require substantial information or specialized knowledge to be evaluated but rather voters' decisions are based on ideological convictions.

The lack of further control variables in the econometric model such as income and education need to be acknowledged. The reason for the lack of control variables has been the small size of the electoral districts. The association between political ideology and voting behavior on the construction of the concert hall has been, however, so pronounced that potential omitted variable bias is very unlikely to change the inferences. In any event, to gain deeper insights into this matter, future research should make a great attempt disentangling ideology-induced motives from motives that relate to income and education. Employing data for Switzerland emerges as a worthwhile endeavor (see, e.g., Frey and Pommerehne 1995 and Pommerehne and Schneider 1985).

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Appendix: Electoral districts and boroughs **(Source: Electoral Office Konstanz):**

Altstadt: Rathaus, Caritas Kindertagesstätte Arche (I), Caritas Kindertagesstätte Arche (II), Kinderhaus Paradies, Seniorenzentrum, Wallgutschule (I), Wallgutschule (II), Sozialgericht (I), Bürgersaal (Vorraum), Sozialgericht (II)

Paradies: Schänzlesporthalle (I), Schänzlesporthalle (II), Palmenhaus, Wallgutschule (III)

Petershausen-West: Treffpunkt Petershausen (I), Treffpunkt Petershausen (II), Treffpunkt Petershausen (III), Kindergarten Dorothea-von-der-Flüe (I), Kindergarten Dorothea-von-der-Flüe (II), Zeppelin-Gewerbeschule, Kinderhaus Löwenzahn, Kinderkulturzentrum KIKUZ, Zeppelin-Gewerbeschule, Theodor-Heuss-Realschule (Neubau)

Petershausen-Ost: Grundschule Sonnenhalde, Kinderhaus Rappelkiste, Heinrich-Suso-Gymnasium (I), Heinrich-Suso-Gymnasium (II), Parkstift Rosenau

Königsbau: Petrus-Kindergarten, Uni-Laborgebäude V, Caritas-Zentrum Konradihaus (I), Caritas-Zentrum Konradihaus (II),

Allmannsdorf: Caritas Quartiersmanagement, Grundschule Allmannsdorf (I), Grundschule Allmannsdorf (II), Grundschule Allmannsdorf (III)

Staad: ARGE Sportboothafen, Kreuz-Kindergarten

Fürstenberg: Treffpunkt Chérisy (I), Treffpunkt Chérisy (II), Grund- und Hauptschule Berchen (I), Grund- und Hauptschule Berchen (II), Grund- und Hauptschule Berchen (III), Grundschule Wollmatingen, Grundschule Haidelmoos (I), Geschwister-Scholl-Schule, Grundschule Haidelmoos (II)

Wollmatingen: Regenbogenschule (I), Regenbogenschule (II), Kindergarten St. Martin, Gemeindezentrum St. Martin (I), Gemeindezentrum St. Martin (II)

Industriegebiet: Stadtwerke-Verwaltungsgebäude

Egg: Vermögen und Bau Ba.-Wü.-Amt KN


Litzelstetten: Schule Litzelstetten, Pfarrgemeindezentrum Peter und Paul (I), Pfarrgemeindezentrum Peter und Paul (II), Ortsverwaltung Litzelstetten

Dingelsdorf: Kindergarten St. Nikolaus (I), Kindergarten St. Nikolaus (II)

Dettingen: Grund- und Hauptschule Dettingen (I), Grund- und Hauptschule Dettingen (II), Grund- und Hauptschule Dettingen (III)


Wallhausen: Kindergarten Wallhausen

Figure 1: Correlation between the share of “No’s” and the share of Social Democrats.




Correlation: 0.51. Source: Electoral Office Konstanz, own calculations

Figure 2: Correlation between the share of “No’s” and the share of “Linke Liste” (left).




Correlation: 0.44. Source: Electoral Office Konstanz, own calculations

Figure 3: Correlation between the share of “No’s” and the share of Christian Democrats.




Correlation: -0.16. Source: Electoral Office Konstanz, own calculations

Figure 4: Correlation between the share of “No’s” and the share of Free Democrats.




Correlation: -0.56. Source: Electoral Office Konstanz, own calculations

Figure 5: Correlation between the share of “No’s” and the share of Free Voters.



Correlation: -0.59. Source: Electoral Office Konstanz, own calculations

Figure 6: Correlation between the share of “No’s” and the share of Greens.



Correlation: 0.07. Source: Electoral Office Konstanz, own calculations

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
No's (share)	65	67.01	6.64	46.63	78.87	Electoral Office Konstanz
SPD	65	18.37	3.60	10.56	26.34	Electoral Office Konstanz
Green	65	23.54	6.10	8.62	38.05	Electoral Office Konstanz
Linke Liste (left)	65	4.96	2.30	1.53	11.82	Electoral Office Konstanz
CDU	65	21.55	6.00	10.70	36.34	Electoral Office Konstanz
Free Democrats	65	10.32	2.27	6.31	16.42	Electoral Office Konstanz
Free Voters	65	13.83	3.34	7.53	21.86	Electoral Office Konstanz
Other	65	7.43	2.38	3.39	14.94	Electoral Office Konstanz
Turnout (share)	65	47.19	9.90	27.60	63.30	Electoral Office Konstanz
Eligible Voters	65	934.72	175.65	473.00	1353.00	Electoral Office Konstanz
Neighbor district	65	0.22	0.41	0	1	Electoral Office Konstanz (own calculation)
Non-neighbor district	65	0.17	0.38	0	1	Electoral Office Konstanz (own calculation)
Protestant (share)	65	24.31	1.74	20.95	27.62	Statistical Office Konstanz (own calculation)
Catholic (share)	65	40.17	2.99	34.20	49.28	Statistical Office Konstanz (own calculation)
Other Religion (share)	65	1.01	0.46	0.29	3.76	Statistical Office Konstanz (own calculation)
No Religion (share)	65	34.42	3.37	26.53	43.60	Statistical Office Konstanz (own calculation)
High-Income dummy	65	0.31	0.47	0	1	own calculation

Table 2: Regression Results. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors.
Dependent variable: share on No's on concert hall referendum.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Linke Liste	-0.4574 [1.16]	-0.4602 [1.14]	-0.3832 [0.95]	-0.4351 [1.04]
CDU	-0.2451 [0.78]	-0.1928 [0.58]	-0.2512 [0.79]	-0.2127 [0.64]
FDP	-1.3349*** [3.02]	-1.2853*** [2.93]	-1.2231*** [2.85]	-1.2090*** [2.82]
Free Voters	-1.0700*** [5.62]	-1.0392*** [4.63]	-1.1335*** [6.33]	-1.0506*** [4.61]
Green	-0.5168** [2.16]	-0.4678* [1.82]	-0.4716* [1.91]	-0.4339* [1.68]
Other	0.6032* [1.80]	0.5963* [1.76]	0.6708* [1.86]	0.6940* [1.87]
Voting Turnout		-0.0361 [0.48]		-0.0563 [0.64]
Eligible Voters		-0.0021 [0.65]		-0.0002 [0.07]
Neighbor			-0.0313 [0.02]	0.1957 [0.12]
Non-Neighbor			2.1355 [1.24]	2.3235 [1.27]
Constant	110.8088*** [5.99]	111.2928*** [5.83]	108.3765*** [5.74]	108.2472*** [5.57]
Observations	65	65	65	65
R-squared	0.59	0.60	0.60	0.61

Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 3: Regression Results. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors.
 Dependent variable: share on No's on concert hall referendum.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SPD	-0.6032*	-0.5963*	-0.6708*	-0.6940*
	[1.80]	[1.76]	[1.86]	[1.87]
Linke Liste	-1.0607**	-1.0565**	-1.0540**	-1.1291**
	[2.61]	[2.48]	[2.54]	[2.59]
CDU	-0.8483***	-0.7891***	-0.9220***	-0.9067***
	[2.90]	[2.67]	[2.95]	[2.73]
FDP	-1.9381***	-1.8816***	-1.8939***	-1.9030***
	[4.36]	[4.25]	[4.31]	[4.15]
Free Voters	-1.6732***	-1.6355***	-1.8043***	-1.7447***
	[4.59]	[4.39]	[4.72]	[4.26]
Green	-1.1200***	-1.0641***	-1.1424***	-1.1280***
	[3.85]	[3.63]	[3.80]	[3.59]
Voting Turnout		-0.0361		-0.0563
		[0.48]		[0.64]
Eligible Voters		-0.0021		-0.0002
		[0.65]		[0.07]
Neighbor			-0.0313	0.1957
			[0.02]	[0.12]
Non-Neighbor			2.1355	2.3235
			[1.24]	[1.27]
Constant	171.1308***	170.9179***	175.4575***	177.6518***
	[6.70]	[6.90]	[6.45]	[6.53]
Observations	65	65	65	65
R-squared	0.59	0.60	0.60	0.61

Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 4: Regression Results. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors.
 Dependent variable: share on No's on concert hall referendum.
 Religion variables included.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Linke Liste	-0.4546 [1.29]	-0.4781 [1.29]	-0.3073 [0.87]	-0.3473 [0.92]
CDU	-0.4419 [1.41]	-0.3651 [1.15]	-0.4277 [1.42]	-0.4044 [1.26]
FDP	-0.9496** [2.40]	-0.8156** [2.09]	-0.6548 [1.63]	-0.6132 [1.58]
Free Voters	-0.9760*** [4.75]	-0.8704*** [4.52]	-0.9313*** [4.54]	-0.8494*** [4.27]
Green	-0.5648** [2.56]	-0.4606* [1.91]	-0.4088** [2.09]	-0.3663* [1.70]
Other	0.4934 [1.54]	0.5698 [1.65]	0.6319** [2.15]	0.7093** [2.21]
Protestant	-0.8668* [1.83]	-0.7984 [1.53]	-1.2334** [2.13]	-1.1598 [1.62]
Catholic	0.4937* [1.81]	0.6429** [2.09]	0.5029 [1.61]	0.6032 [1.54]
Other Religion	0.4659 [0.48]	0.6936 [0.79]	0.609 [0.64]	0.7397 [0.86]
Voting Turnout		-0.0994 [0.98]		-0.0612 [0.48]
Eligible Voters		-0.0022 [0.71]		0.0005 [0.14]
Neighbor			-2.6311 [1.66]	-2.5247 [1.41]
Non-Neighbor			2.2056 [1.09]	2.2413 [0.84]
Constant	112.4768*** [5.27]	103.9167*** [3.97]	111.6697*** [4.78]	104.6377*** [3.51]
Observations	65	65	65	65
R-squared	0.65	0.65	0.67	0.67

Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

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